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KEYNOTE ADDRESS
THE POLITICS OF HOPE: FREE POLITICS
AND FREE MARKETS IN LATIN AMERICA
JORGE I. DOM´INGUEZ*
How should citizens and scholars think about free politics and free
markets in Latin America? Questions about the relationship between free
politics and free markets have a long distinguished intellectual and practical
history through time and across countries. How do the forms of the political
regime make it possible for human beings to live in concert with each other,
govern the economy and society, and enable citizens to govern themselves
in purposeful ways? We continue to pose these kinds of questions in many
different circumstances, areas, and parts of the world’s geography.
In this article, I will argue that Latin Americans in the 1980s and
1990s discovered, to their surprise, the utility of democratic politics to im-
prove the workings of a market economy. Latin American dictatorships
failed to provide for economic growth in the 1970s and presided over eco-
nomic collapse in the early 1980s. Out of the ashes of bankrupt autocracies,
Latin Americans found that key elements of democratic political systems
could better shape the foundations for market economies and foster
prosperity.
THE GENERAL DEBATE ABOUT DEMOCRACY AND MARKETS
Two centuries ago, on the eve of the victory of capitalism, and as dem-
ocratic forces had begun to spread, very bright people had serious doubts
that free politics could ever coexist with free markets because each would
undermine the other. The concern about mob rule, for example, is one of
the reasons, albeit not the only one, why the American Constitution at the
end of the eighteenth century shows such a complexity of federal institu-
tions, that is, the balance of powers or the mutual checking of authority
* Antonio Madero Professor of Mexican and Latin American Politics and Economics in the
Department of Government, Vice Provost for International Affairs in the Office of the Provost,
Senior Advisor for International Studies to the Dean of the Faculty of Arts and Sciences, and
Chairman of the Harvard Academy for International and Area Studies at Harvard University. This
is an edited transcript of remarks delivered at the Latin America: Economic Development and
Social Justice symposium, University of St. Thomas School of Law, March 2008.
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between institutions. There was an important and understandable fear that
popular majorities through the federal government could override individ-
ual liberties and rights as well as the capacity of enterprises to retain their
economic autonomy. Similarly, throughout the nineteenth century Karl
Marx, Alexis de Tocqueville, John Stuart Mill, and Pius IX, among others,
worried whether democracy and markets were inherently good, and whether
they would coexist or undermine each other.
Only in relatively recent times have many people, particularly in the
countries found on both sides of the North Atlantic, though increasingly in
other parts of the world as well, come to think of representative democracy
and the market economy as not only capable of coexisting but also as mutu-
ally supportive of each other.
Even so, whether free markets and free politics may be mutually sup-
portive remains a contested issue down to our own day. The reason for the
change of opinion is clear: the countries that have been able to sustain rep-
resentative democracy over a long period of time are anchored in market
economies. This encompasses the experience of most countries in western
Europe, North America, Japan, Australia, and New Zealand for the last six
decades. The market economy can be good for democracy, even if some
market economies may thrive as well under authoritarian rule (contempo-
rary China, Bismarck’s Germany). The market economy deconcentrates ec-
onomic power. After some lag, such economic deconcentration helps also
to deconcentrate aspects of political power, thus providing an underpinning
for democracy.
The reason for persisting doubt about the coexistence of free politics
and free markets is equally clear: Is democratic politics also good for a
market economy? Does democratic politics enhance the support and the
possibilities of prosperity associated with capitalism? This doubt helps us to
understand much of the last half century of political and economic struggles
in many Latin American countries.
LATIN AMERICA IN THE 1970S: IS DICTATORSHIP THE BETTER CHOICE?
Let us focus first on the Latin America of the early 1970s as the start-
ing point for a stylized story of the aggregate of Latin American political
and economic trends in the last third of the twentieth century and the start
of this century. In the early 1970s, there was genuine active doubt, as both a
philosophical concern and a practical matter, whether democratic regimes in
Latin America could make it possible for the economy to grow and permit
the spread of the prosperity to the citizenry.
The key case at the start of the 1970s occurred in Chile. By 1973, the
socialist coalition headed by President Salvador Allende presided over an
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economy with an inflation rate that exceeded 600 percent that year.1 With
such an inflation rate, the currency is worthless. The economy loses its ca-
pacity to function by almost any standard. Chile was mired in a widespread
and dramatic economic crisis that preceded a traumatic political crisis—the
military coup of September 1973.
More generally, throughout several of the larger South American
countries, similar phenomena occurred. Democratic regimes presided over
economic collapse. Consider Argentina. By the mid-1970s Argentine infla-
tion rates systematically exceeded 100 percent per year.2 Except for two
years, Argentina’s annual inflation rate exceeded 100 percent per year be-
tween the early 1970s and the beginning of the 1990s.3 By the end of the
1980s, the Argentine annual inflation rate passed 1000 percent.4
These facts generated intense debates over political, economic, and
moral questions. Countries seemed to face a cruel choice.5 There could be
free politics or there could be free markets, but there could not be both.
There could be liberty or there could be prosperity, but citizens could not
have both. Only an authoritarian regime—many came to believe—would
make the economy grow.6 A democratic regime would permit the exercise
of personal liberties and the choice of rulers, but the economy would be
condemned to very high inflation rates and malperformance.
Economic actors, business executives, political leaders, and many aca-
demics came to believe in the reality of such a cruel choice. Many came to
such a conclusion with extraordinary sadness, but the result was a general
continental turn to authoritarian rule. By the end of the 1970s, authoritarian
regimes had spread throughout nearly all of Latin America, except for Ven-
ezuela, Colombia, and Costa Rica.
Military rule did not just come out from the barrel of a gun. Rather,
civilians provided broad political support for military coups in many coun-
tries because they thought that this cruel choice had to be made. They bet
that the military would bring order and prosperity, albeit knowingly at the
expense of democracy and their liberties.
Soon, however, Latin Americans realized that the military officers who
had come to govern them seemed to believe in equal-opportunity ineptitude.
These authoritarian governments turned out to be no better at governing the
1. Rudiger Dornbusch & Sebastian Edwards, Macroeconomic Populism, 32 J. DEV. ECON.
247, 260 tbl.1 (1990).
2. U.N. Econ. Comm’n for Latin Am. & the Caribbean [CEPAL], Preliminary Overview of
Latin America and the Caribbean 1984, at tbl.5, U.N. Doc. LC/G.1336 (1984).
3. Id.; U.N. Econ. Comm’n for Latin Am. & the Caribbean [CEPAL], Preliminary Over-
view of Latin America and the Caribbean 1992, at 43 tbl.5, U.N. Doc. LC/G.1751 (1992).
4. U.N. Econ. Comm’n for Latin Am. & the Caribbean [CEPAL], supra note 3, at 43 tbl.5.
5. See generally DENNIS GOULET, THE CRUEL CHOICE: A NEW CONCEPT IN THE THEORY OF
DEVELOPMENT 299–309 (1971).
6. See Karen L. Remmer, Democracy and Economic Crisis: The Latin American Experi-
ence, 42 WORLD POL. 315, 317–18 (1990).
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economy than the governments they had overthrown.7 Inflation rates in Ar-
gentina, as noted, did surpass 100 percent each and every year except two
over two decades,8 but that awful fact occurred under both civilian and
military regimes.9 It was under military government that Brazil’s inflation
rate also zoomed up; its economy ran into severe difficulties in the early
1980s.10 All of a sudden the notion of a “cruel choice” seemed unreal. Citi-
zens had no choice. Latin Americans were stuck with bad governments no
matter who governed them.
Authoritarian regimes caused damages well beyond economic harm. In
moral terms, they performed worse than Chilean, Argentine, or Brazilian
civilian rulers did in the late 1950s and early 1960s. In the name of public
order, many military regimes committed murder. Not all did so to the same
extent or to the same degree, but the expression “violations of human
rights” does not do justice to the horror of the tens of thousands who were
killed, in most instances with no semblance of due process of law.11
Thus many who had been part of the military coup coalition, which
provided political support for coups in the hope of bringing about order and
therefore reach prosperity, began to back out. They discovered that the gov-
ernments of the armed forces did a terrible job. In Chile, for example, many
of the same Roman Catholic bishops who accepted the 1973 military coup
in order to save the country from the Communists had, by the late 1970s,
recoiled at the horror of mass murder of political opponents committed by
the security forces.12 Many business executives realized that their busi-
nesses might go bankrupt because military rulers were inept.13 They came
to fear that military rulers might kill their children just because the young-
sters were at the wrong place at the wrong time. University students in
particular were the targets of this dramatic wave of repression that washed
across many countries in the region from the mid-1970s through the begin-
ning of the 1980s.
7. See id. at 318, 324–27.
8. U.N. Econ. Comm’n for Latin Am. & the Caribbean [CEPAL], supra note 2, at tbl.5;
U.N. Econ. Comm’n for Latin Am. & the Caribbean [CEPAL], supra note 3, at 43 tbl.5.
9. See Remmer, supra note 6, at 332.
10. Id. at 328–30; Eliana Cardoso & Daniel Dantas, Brazil, in LATIN AMERICAN ADJUST-
MENT: HOW MUCH HAS HAPPENED? 129, 131 tbl.4.4 (John Williamson ed., 1990).
11. For a summary in an international context, see generally KATHRYN SIKKINK, MIXED SIG-
NALS: U.S. HUMAN RIGHTS POLICY AND LATIN AMERICA (2004).
12. BRIAN H. SMITH, THE CHURCH AND POLITICS IN CHILE: CHALLENGES TO MODERN CA-
THOLICISM 283–355 (1982).
13. See generally LEIGH A. PAYNE, BRAZILIAN INDUSTRIALISTS AND DEMOCRATIC CHANGE
126–51 (1994).
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LATIN AMERICA IN THE 1980S: MIGHT DEMOCRACY BE THE
BETTER CHOICE?
In response to this succession of catastrophes, there were changes
across the societal spectrum. On the political right, business executives
changed their views. It may have seemed reasonable for them at one point
to support a military coup, but they had come to witness economic misrule,
the tearing apart of the moral fabric of the society, and the killing of young
people including many whom those executives knew as relatives or friends
of their children. Those outcomes were unacceptable. These business exec-
utives began to look for ways to transition to democracy. In Brazil, for
example, many business executives took the lead in fostering an opening
toward democratic politics.14
On the political left, many politicians came to a similar realization.
Many of their friends, their comrades, and their allies had been killed. The
Left had been the principal object of the often-indiscriminate repression that
had taken place. In Brazil in 1964 and in Chile in 1973, for example, the
respective military coups were aimed at overthrowing a left-wing incum-
bent government, all in the name of combating communists. The political
left knew how catastrophic the consequences of that perceived cruel choice
had been. Many on the political left also came to understand that some of
their own governments had not served well those whom the Left claimed to
represent politically. Nor had the Left governments made the economy
grow.
Throughout the 1980s, this process of change led people to reimagine
who they were in their roles as politicians, business executives, and citizens
on the right and the left. Political parties and international party federations,
such as the Socialist International of the Social Democratic parties or the
World Federation of Christian Democrats of the Christian Democratic par-
ties, played an important role in facilitating ideological rethinking across
the Latin American political spectrum.15 These national and international
processes of rethinking gave new means to political activists to organize
and to shape the transition that gradually would take place toward a market
economy and democratic politics during the 1980s.16
Other international factors helped. The European Union promoted
Latin American democracy in the 1980s. The U.S. government was a lag-
gard with regard to these trends, but by the second Reagan administration
the United States also adopted policies that would support human rights and
14. Id. at xiii.
15. Wolf Grabendorff, International Support for Democracy in Contemporary Latin
America: The Role of the Party Internationals, in THE INTERNATIONAL DIMENSIONS OF DEMOCRA-
TIZATION: EUROPE AND THE AMERICAS 201–26 (Laurence Whitehead ed., 2001).
16. Id.
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foster democratic transitions in the last two South American countries to
make the political transition, Chile and Paraguay.17
THE PINOCHET DICTATORSHIP IN CHILE: WAS IT A GOOD MODEL?
Let us now consider a common objection to the argument regarding
the poor economic performance of Latin American authoritarian regimes:
Was not the dictatorship of General Augusto Pinochet in Chile good for the
economy? Was he not an example of an authoritarian ruler who governed
the Chilean economy well, making it possible for Chile’s economy to
prosper?
First, in general, it is not difficult today or one hundred years ago to
find examples where economies grow under authoritarian regimes. Eco-
nomic growth picked up speed in imperial Germany and in imperial Japan
in the late nineteenth century as well as in Tsarist Russia, for example.18
Similarly, there are worldwide statistical studies about the relationship be-
tween the form of a political regime, on the one hand, and economic out-
comes, on the other. For the most part, the relationship is either statistically
insignificant or democracy has a slight advantage.19
Thus my argument is not that only democracies make it possible for
the economy to grow or that regardless of time and context authoritarian
regimes always fail. Rather, I argue that during the last third of the twenti-
eth century Latin Americans discovered that the authoritarian regimes in
their countries did not make the economies grow and did not provide for
prosperity. Because the economic record of dictatorship in Latin America
was so poor, it was easier in this region at this time to shift the course of
history toward a future that would be open for the politics of hope. And it is
the politics of hope that motivates my work.
Second, turn now to the specific example of General Pinochet’s Chile.
He came to power at a terrible time for the Chilean economy. Under his rule
in the late 1970s, however, the Chilean economy continued to experience
difficulties.20 At the beginning of the 1980s, the so-called Latin American
debt crisis broke out. It was much more than a debt crisis—it was a deep
recession that hit this region almost as hard as the 1930s worldwide eco-
17. THOMAS CAROTHERS, IN THE NAME OF DEMOCRACY: U.S. POLICY TOWARD LATIN
AMERICA IN THE REAGAN YEARS 150–66 (1991).
18. See ALEXANDER GERSCHENKRON, ECONOMIC BACKWARDNESS IN HISTORICAL PERSPEC-
TIVE 78 (1962).
19. See generally Robert J. Barro, Inequality and Growth in a Panel of Countries, 5 J. ECON.
GROWTH 5, 6–7 (2000); Remmer, supra note 6, at 324–26.
20. Sebastian Edwards, Stabilization with Liberalization: An Evaluation of Ten Years of
Chile’s Experiment with Free-Market Policies, 1973–1983, 33 ECON. DEV. & CULTURAL CHANGE
223, 224–25 (1985).
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nomic depression had.21 In 1982, the Chilean economy under General Pi-
nochet plunged further and faster than any other Latin American economy
of comparable size. In that year, Chile’s gross domestic product fell 14.3
percent, a far steeper one-year drop in the 1981–83 interval than Argen-
tina’s, Brazil’s, Mexico’s, or Peru’s.22 Thus General Pinochet turned out to
be a worse manager of the economy than his peers, namely, other southern
South American dictators.
One may still object that this account is unfair to Pinochet because he
had encountered a bankrupt, desperate Chilean economy in the 1970s. What
about the second decade of Pinochet’s rule?23 Chilean economic perform-
ance in the 1980s was, indeed, better than Chilean economic performance in
the 1970s. Between 1981 and 1990, gross domestic product per capita in
Chile grew at less than 1 percent per year on average.24 That is better than
zero and better than plunging and negative trends but is not an economic
miracle, which is how Pinochet’s economic performance is often character-
ized. The only miracle was in public relations. The Pinochet government
succeeded in persuading the international press and others that there had
been an economic miracle when in fact there had been none. The boom in
the Chilean economy does not date back to the seventeen years of the Pi-
nochet dictatorship. Chilean gross domestic product per capita grew over
four times faster under the democratic governments in the 1990s than it had
in the 1980s under Pinochet.25
WHY MAY DEMOCRACY BE GOOD FOR THE MARKET ECONOMY?
A GENERAL ARGUMENT
Why may democracies foster good performance in a market economy?
The answer is at the heart of an analysis motivated by the politics of hope.
This is, to be sure, not about the politics of certainty; the argument must be
framed in terms of likelihood and probabilities, not assurances.
Democracies can do a number of things to improve the operation of
the market economy. One has been mentioned: democracies may deconcen-
trate economic power and thus make it easier to further deconcentrate polit-
ical power. For example, during the second half of the twentieth century the
21. See Ricardo French-Davis, Oscar Munoz & Jose Gariel Palma, The Latin American
Economies, 1950–1990, in THE CAMBRIDGE HISTORY OF LATIN AMERICA: LATIN AMERICA SINCE
1930 186 (Leslie Bethell ed., 1994).
22. U.N. Econ. Comm’n for Latin Am. & the Caribbean [CEPAL], supra note 2, at tbl.2.
23. Pinochet governed between 1973 and 1990. See PAMELA CONSTABLE & ARTURO
VALENZUELA, A NATION OF ENEMIES: CHILE UNDER PINOCHET (1991).
24. U.N. Econ. Comm’n for Latin Am. & the Caribbean [CEPAL], Preliminary Overview of
the Economy of Latin America and the Caribbean 1990, at 26 tbl.3, U.N. Doc. LC/G.1646 (1990).
25. See U.N. Econ. Comm’n for Latin Am. & the Caribbean [CEPAL], Current Conditions
and Outlook: Economic Survey of Latin America and the Caribbean 2000–2001, at 33 tbl.A.3,
U.N. Doc. LC/G.2142-P, U.N. Sales No. E.01.II.G.121 (2001); cf. U.N. Econ. Comm’n for Latin
Am. & the Caribbean [CEPAL], supra note 24, at 26 tbl.3.
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growth in the number of Brazil’s state enterprises was most pronounced
during the years of military rule—not under civilian rule.26 Brazilian mili-
tary rulers sought to use state enterprises to consolidate their political power
over the strategic sectors of the economy.27 One way, therefore, to reintro-
duce the possibilities of sustained democratic politics in Brazil was to de-
concentrate economic power so that the state would not own and operate
such a large fraction of the means of production. Deconcentrating power
was good for democratization itself, and it also rendered democratization
effective in fostering market competition.
Democracy may also be good for the market economy because democ-
racy provides a means to get rid of bad rulers without resorting to violence.
That is what elections enable citizens to do and what Latin Americans did
in elections again and again at the end of the 1980s. Even in the countries
that had democratized already, citizens were unhappy with their govern-
ments and with so many presidents who served them badly during the
1980s. In the early to mid-1980s, the first Latin American civilian govern-
ments that followed the end of several dictatorships did not govern the
economy well; inflation and unemployment rose but economic growth did
not—this was the experience of Argentina under President Rau´l Alfonsı´n,
Brazil under President Jose´ Sarney, and Peru under President Fernando Be-
lau´nde, among others. Democracies provide a peaceful way to dislodge in-
effective rulers without recourse to military coup, insurgency, or revolution.
Democracies may also help market economies because democracies
may lower what economists call transaction costs, in this case, the cost of
the procedures, exogenous to the economic activity in question, that are
necessary to accomplish a specific outcome, including the cost of the lack
of procedures to accomplish a desired outcome. For example, a business
firm that produces widgets incurs direct costs in making those widgets.
Suppose that the workers who make the widgets join a general strike in
opposition to the government. For reasons entirely unrelated to the widget-
making firm, the widget factory shuts down; the cost of doing business
rises. Revolutions, military coups, and similar political events are other ex-
amples of such transaction costs.
Citizens in democracies may oppose a government by creating politi-
cal parties, nongovernmental organizations, or social movements. Citizens
need not pick up a gun and become revolutionaries, insurgents, or military
coup plotters. In lowering transaction costs, democracies also provide for
alternative means to address problems. Democracy exemplifies alternative
dispute resolution, above all, providing alternatives to overthrowing the
government by violence.
26. See THOMAS TREBAT, BRAZIL’S STATE-OWNED ENTERPRISES: A CASE STUDY OF THE
STATE AS ENTREPRENEUR 43–55 (1983).
27. Id.
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Finally, democracies are better than authoritarian regimes at creating
procedures to make credible commitments regarding the future. How does
this work and why is it important? Suppose we live in an authoritarian re-
gime and I am the president. I can promise you that circumstances will be
ideal, perfect, and flawless for your investments whether you are a citizen
of my country or an international investor. But I can only do so until the
day when I stop being dictator. I cannot commit the day after I stop being a
dictator because I would have died or been overthrown. Alternatively, if I
am the central bank president in an authoritarian regime or the economy
minister of an authoritarian regime, I can only promise a policy outcome
during my time in office.
Democracies can make credible commitments regarding the future by
creating or fashioning long-term fundamental rules to govern the economy.
This is achieved through reliance on political supermajorities that engage
government and opposition parties to set the overarching framework of rule
of law necessary for the market economy. As different politicians win elec-
tions and various political parties come to govern, there would be, of
course, short-term changes in many specific policies. New incumbents
could alter expenditure patterns and tax rates but law-abiding democratic
politicians would not violate the fundamental framework of the rule of law
to govern the economy. That is the key to a happy marriage between de-
mocracy and markets in the North Atlantic democracies. And that is the
process that Latin American leaders in politics, business, labor, and the pro-
fessions gradually began to learn in the 1980s.
CHILE AFTER 1990
Chile played an important part in the Latin American story of the last
third of the twentieth century. The Pinochet government ended in 1990,
succeeded by a coalition headed by a Christian Democratic president.28
That coalition had won a large majority mandate in the 1990 election.29 The
new incumbents wanted to change laws, budget expenditures, and taxes. In
particular, they wanted to raise taxes to invest more in education, health
care, and poverty reduction.30
Chile has performed well over the last decade and a half. It has im-
proved the quality of education and health care and reduced poverty rates. It
has done less well in affecting the relative distribution of income. The good
outcomes began in the early 1990s. The key strategic decision of the Chris-
tian Democratic-led coalition was to avoid trying to use its electoral major-
ity as a means to impose a tax rate increase and a new expenditure pattern
28. CONSTABLE & VALENZUELA, supra note 23, at 313–16.
29. Id. at 316.
30. See Jeanne Kinney Giraldo, Development and Democracy in Chile: Finance Minister
Alejandro Foxley and the Concertacio´n’s Project for the 1990s, in TECHNOPOLS: FREEING POLIT-
ICS AND MARKETS IN LATIN AMERICA IN THE 1990S 229, 231 (Jorge I. Domı´nguez ed., 1997).
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on society.31 Instead, the governing coalition decided to proceed only
through a legislative supermajority.32 The opposition coalition, once Pi-
nochet supporters, had two political parties. The government made an
agreement with one of those two parties in the Pinochet coalition, deliber-
ately and consciously lowering expectations among core government sup-
porters and cutting back on the government’s goals.33
The new democratic government curtailed its ambitions because it
needed a partner from the opposition to set the rules to govern the future. It
increased taxes at a lower rate than it had wanted and targeted expenditures
more narrowly in order to create a lasting framework that elicited broad
national support, not just support in the governing coalition.34 If these new
incumbents were to lose the next election and the opposition would come
back to power, the fundamental rules would not change. Promises would
not be broken. Instead, the democratic government and one of the large
parties of the opposition fashioned a set of rules that would endure across
coalitions, parties, and time.35 They committed to the future by relying
upon supermajorities. It worked.
ARGENTINA AFTER 1990
Next, consider Argentina again. It had been the Olympic champion of
inflation rates in the 1970s and 1980s—the Latin American country that
invented underdevelopment. As the twentieth century began, Argentina had
been performing like a European country located on the other side of the
Atlantic Ocean, yet it would manage to become underdeveloped through
much of the twentieth century.36 Its politicians seemed to believe in equal-
opportunity ineptitude.
In the late 1980s, Argentina experimented with a variant of the hypoth-
esis that only dictators could set the economy right. Carlos Menem, the
elected president of Argentina, behaved as if all powers were concentrated
in the office of the president; in this view, only he could make the strong
decisions to set the economy right.37 Menem tried to order the economy to
work by decree; he failed just as badly as his predecessors had. In the early
1990s, his economy minister, Domingo Cavallo, had an important insight.
The problems of the Argentine economy were not all that complicated; any-
31. Id. at 258.
32. Id. at 265–68.
33. Id.
34. Delia M. Boylan, Taxation and Transition: The Politics of the 1990 Chilean Tax Reform,
31 LATIN AM. RES. REV. 7, 12–15 (1996).
35. See Peter M. Siavelis, Chile: The End of the Unfinished Transition, in CONSTRUCTING
DEMOCRATIC GOVERNANCE IN LATIN AMERICA 177, 177–208 (Jorge I. Domı´nguez & Michael
Shifter eds., 3d ed. 2008).
36. This section relies on JAVIER CORRALES, PRESIDENTS WITHOUT PARTIES: THE POLITICS OF
ECONOMIC REFORM IN ARGENTINA AND VENEZUELA IN THE 1990S (2002).
37. Id. at 218–20.
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one could go into a regular bookstore and take out the textbook of Econom-
ics 101 to see the various things that Argentina did wrong.38
The problem with Argentina’s economy was that its citizens, for very
good reasons based on decades of experience, did not trust or believe those
who governed them. In response to that insight, Menem and Cavallo opted
to try to bind the hands of the government so that even they would not
engage in destructive economic policies. They did so through the so-called
convertibility law, which constrained exchange rate and monetary poli-
cies.39 That particular rule should have been changed during the 1990s for
technical reasons beyond these remarks. Yet, let me emphasize that the key
to their approach was their reliance on law, not merely on decrees.
In the early 1990s, the Argentine governments—though scholars writ-
ing at the time did not recognize the change40—moved away from trying to
govern by decree or ordering the economy somehow to behave rightly. In-
stead, the incumbents realized that they could only govern well by creating
large legislative majorities in Congress.41 The goal was to ensure that, if the
opposition were to win, citizens and national and international investors
could be confident that the fundamental rules for politics and the economy
would persist. Thus the Argentine Congress had to vote on each and every
major decision to privatize any state enterprise.42 Key decisions about eco-
nomic policy would not be just the whim of the president and his ministers
but of the National Congress enacting legislation. This capacity to bind the
future through law demonstrated the utility of democracy to create confi-
dence in the continuation of fundamental policies in the future, which be-
came one of the keys to open the Argentine economy’s recovery.
Argentina’s economy would later collapse for other reasons at the begin-
ning of this century’s first decade, but many of those reforms enacted in the
1990s through this broad-based legislative process made it possible, in part,
for the Argentine economy to grow again as this decade unfolded.
BRAZIL FACES FINANCIAL CRISES: 1997–1999
Let us now examine Brazil’s responses to comparable difficulties. In
1997, a worldwide financial crisis broke in East Asia. It affected Thailand,
Indonesia, and South Korea, among others. Its effects spread beyond the
region, affecting the circumstances of other countries. International inves-
tors fled from capital markets in emerging economies. Brazil was one of
these countries adversely affected by this financial tsunami.
The president of Brazil at the time, Fernando Henrique Cardoso, had
also learned lessons from his neighbors. He knew that he could not build
38. Id. at 173–74.
39. Id. at 190–91.
40. See, e.g., Guillermo O’Donnell, Delegative Democracy, 5 J. DEMOCRACY 55 (1994).
41. CORRALES, supra note 36, at 176–78.
42. Id.
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credibility merely by evoking all the majesty of his powers as Brazil’s pres-
ident, hoping somehow to set right what was going wrong.43 Credibility
depended on working through supermajorities to give concrete meaning to
that important but often vague concept, “political will.” To protect Brazil
from the adverse impact of the 1997 financial crisis, the president went to
Congress to build a supermajority to curtail expenditures, raise taxes, and
cut the budget deficit. There had to be broad political support to enact tough
economic measures in order to shield Brazil from the worst of that financial
crisis.44
In 1998, another financial crisis broke out in Russia. There was again
worry whether Brazil could cope. In 1998, Cardoso was up for reelection;
he delivered a Churchillian speech on national radio and television. He
asked Brazilians to vote for him, but he warned them that Brazil faced the
equivalent of toil, tears, and sweat—as British Prime Minister Winston
Churchill informed his fellow citizens at the darkest moment in World War
II. In Brazil in 1998, President Cardoso wanted it to be known that Con-
gress had to raise taxes and cut expenditures. He asked for public trust that
he would bear the public interest at heart. He won reelection and proceeded
again to work with supermajorities to convey credibly the commitment to
sound policies.
Brazil did face a financial panic in January of 1999 when the governor
of one of its largest states refused to pay its financial debt obligations. The
pattern of this crisis on a chart looked like the letter V. Brazil’s economy
declined sharply but bounced back quickly because President Cardoso again
fashioned a supermajority in Congress to create credibility to stabilize mar-
kets and enable the economy to recover.45
These examples show evidence consistent with the argument about the
instrumental utility of democracy for the market economy. The good news
is that democracy may also be useful to make the market economy work
and generate prosperity.
LATIN AMERICA TODAY
Why are so many Latin Americans unhappy with their circumstances
and why do so many believe that there is no happy marriage between free
politics and free markets? The reasons vary; many are particular to individ-
ual countries. But there is a large number of Latin Americans in many
countries who are dissatisfied with how they live under these representative
43. See generally Riordan Roett, Brazilian Politics at Century’s End, in BRAZIL UNDER
CARDOSO 19, 19–41 (Susan Kaufman Purcell & Riordan Roett eds., 1997).
44. Lagniappe Letter: Biweekly Report of Issues Affecting Business in Latin America, Dec.
12, 1997, at 3.
45. For a general discussion about these issues in Brazil, see generally Juan Martı´nez &
Javier Santiso, Financial Markets and Politics: The Confidence Game in Latin American Emerg-
ing Economies, 24 INT’L POL. SCI. REV. 363 (2003).
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democracies. Even so, characteristically across the region, fewer than one
out of five Latin Americans in public opinion polls express a preference for
authoritarian rule.46 Latin Americans still prefer representative democracy,
but they also are unhappy about how it has performed governing them.47
Latin America as a whole is the leader in income inequality. World
Bank figures on income inequality are difficult to gather and their validity
is often difficult to ascertain. Yet, observations over time and across coun-
tries show that Latin American countries constitute the most unequal region
in the world, with the least change at that high level of inequality over a
long time. Mexico, for example, has some of the oldest statistical records
about inequality over time. Its so-called Gini index of inequality has basi-
cally not changed. It shows an almost identical distribution of income ine-
quality in this decade as it did when the first professional measurement was
made in 1950.48
Thus Latin Americans for the most part, not just Mexicans, are un-
happy about economic performance, growth, and the insufficient decline in
poverty. In elections, these themes have manifested strongly as voters de-
feat incumbents whom they believe have served them poorly. This dynamic
has emerged most clearly in Venezuela, led by President Hugo Cha´vez.
Venezuela did not suffer the traumatic circumstances described earlier
in discussing Latin America in the 1970s. Venezuela had been governed by
civilian democratic regimes in a highly competitive political system.49 It
depended principally on petroleum revenues; its non-oil economy did not
grow much. Therefore, Venezuela did not go through the learning process
described for the 1980s elsewhere in the region. Venezuelans did not dis-
cover the utility of free politics and free markets at the same time as their
neighbors. By the end of the 1980s, Venezuela was at a juncture: change
was needed but not enough Venezuelans believed that to be the case.50 One
Venezuelan government attempted but did not succeed in reforming the
economy and enacting political changes.51 From that failure to learn and
change, Hugo Cha´vez’s political support emerged. Cha´vez’s rise corre-
sponded to real problems in Venezuela’s politics and economics. He be-
came the spokesman for those who were understandably dissatisfied with
the performance of democratic politics in Venezuela. He has now become a
spokesman for discontent worldwide.
46. Marta Lagos, Public Opinion, in CONSTRUCTING DEMOCRATIC GOVERNANCE IN LATIN
AMERICA 137, 151 tbl.7.4 (Jorge I. Domı´nguez & Michael Shifter eds., 2d ed. 2003).
47. Id. at 155 tbl.7.5.
48. World Bank, 2004 World Development Indicators, at 61 tbl.2–7, Report No. 28969 (Jan.
1, 2004).
49. See generally David J. Myers, Venezuela: Delegative Democracy or Electoral Autoc-
racy?, in CONSTRUCTING DEMOCRATIC GOVERNANCE IN LATIN AMERICA, supra note 35, at 285,
287.
50. Id. at 294.
51. Id.
\\server05\productn\U\UST\5-3\UST302.txt unknown Seq: 14 17-MAR-09 6:39
638 UNIVERSITY OF ST. THOMAS LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 5:3
CONCLUSION
Notwithstanding many insufficiently addressed problems and setbacks
for democratic change or the wide sharing of prosperity, I remain reassured
by the line of analysis described in these remarks. Democratic governments
can work. Democratic political systems can combine liberties, representa-
tion, and economic growth, as evident in countries as different as Chile,
Brazil, and Mexico.
The success of the politics of hope requires political action to make
individuals conscious that the challenges before all of the countries of this
region remain deep and troubling. It is good news that poverty rates have
finally dropped in Chile, Brazil, and Mexico, yet they remain high in most
countries.52 The human capital of ordinary Latin Americans—their skill and
educational levels—remains too low by world standards and surely too low
to fulfill the hopes that parents have for their children.
Latin America has had in many respects a terrible history. Relative to
that terrible history, in the 1990s and early 2000s, much was done that has
been successful and creative. It made life better for millions of Latin Ameri-
cans. The challenge now is to recognize the legitimate complaints of so
many citizens who remain unhappy that their democratic governments have
not governed effectively enough and have not empowered them to be free
and prosperous in a just society, as they wish.
52. NANCY BIRDSALL, AUGUSTO DE LA TORRE & RACHEL MENEZES, FAIR GROWTH: ECO-
NOMIC POLICIES FOR LATIN AMERICA’S POOR AND MIDDLE-INCOME MAJORITY 23 tbl.1 (2008).
